Fred Wilstead v. The Industrial Commission of Utah, The Independent Coal & Coke Co., and Continental Casualty Co : Respondent\u27s Brief by unknown
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (cases filed before 1965)
1965
Fred Wilstead v. The Industrial Commission of
Utah, The Independent Coal & Coke Co., and
Continental Casualty Co : Respondent's Brief
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc1
Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machine-
generated OCR, may contain errors.Dale E. Anderson of Fabian & Clendenin; Attorneys for
defendants The Independent Coal & Coke Company and Continental Casualty Company.
This Brief of Respondent is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs (cases filed before 1965) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Respondent, Wilstead v. Industrial Comm'n of Utah, No. 10318 (1965).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc1/4797
IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
FRED WILSTEAD, 
Plaintiff arul, Appellant, 
vs. 
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMIS- Case No. 
SION OF UTAH, THE INDE- 10818 
PENDENT COAL & C 0 KE ) 
COMPANY AND CONTINEN-
TAL CASUALTY COMPANY, 
Def endanta arul, Responilenta. 
IJNIVERSlTY OF UT AH 
RESPONDENT'S BRJi\f 1 5 1965 
--- ~ LAW LIBRAR't 
Review ol an Awud of~ - of utab ~. JUN~sfs D 
···ci~;i--5·-·-·········· 
Dale E. "beeiiii1.··----. 
FABIAN & CLEN'.O:MNm--
800 Continental Bank Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Attorneys for defendants The 
Independent Coal & Coke Company 
and Continental Casualty Company 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Page 
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE .... I 
DISPOSITION BY INDUSTRIAL 
COMMISSION ...................................................... 2 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL .................... 2 
STATEMENT OF FACTS .................................. 2 
ARGUMENT ............................................................ 4 
I. This Court's review is limited by Utah Code 
Annotated 1953, Section 35-1-84 to a determination 
of: .................................................................................. 4 
( 1 ) Whether or not the Commission acted 
within or in excess of its powers. ............ .................... 4 
( b) If findings of fact are made, whether or not 
s~ch findings of fact support the award under re-
view. . .............................. ....... .......................................... 4 
II. An injured employee ceases to be temporarily 
and totally disabled when his physical condition is 
such that he is only partially disabled and an injured 
employee who is only partially disabled cannot be 
entitled to total disability payments........................... 7 
CONCLUSION .......................................................... 14 
1 
AUTHORITIES CITED 
CASES 
Page 
Chief Consol. Min. Co. v. Industrial Comm., 
70 Utah 333, 260 Pac. 27I ---------------------------····· j 
Continental Casualty Co. v. Industrial Comm., 
79 Utah 532, I I P .2d 329 ----------------------------···· ~ 
Kelly v. Industrial Comm., 80 Utah 73, I2 P.2d 
I I I 2 --- -- ---- --- ------ -- ---- ------ --- -- -- ------- ------ ------ --- ---------···· 5 
Park City v. Industrial Comm., 63 Utah 205, 
224 Pac. 655 ---------------------------------------------------····· 
Peerless Sales Co. et al v. Industrial Comm. et al, 
I07 Utah 4I9, I54 P.2d 644 -----------------------------··· 
Spring Canyon Coal Co. v. Industrial Comm., 
58 Utah 608, 277 Pac. 206 -------------------------·--······ II 
Tintic Standard Min. Co. v. Industrial Comm., 
IOO Utah 96, no P.2d 367 -------------------------------· 5 
STATUTES AND RULES 
d 1 35-I-65 Utah Code Annotate I953 ---------------------····· 
35-I-66 Utah Code Annotated I953 ------------------------·· 
35-I-84 Utah Code Annotated I 953 ----------------------···· l 
11 
IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
FRED "\VILSTEAD, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
vs. 
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMIS-
SION OF UTAH, THE INDE-
PENDENT COAL & C 0 K E 
COl\IP ANY AND CONTINEN-
TAL CASUALTY COMPANY, 
Defendants and Respondents. 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 
Statement Of The Kind Of Case 
Case No. 
10318 
This is an action for the recovery of temporary 
total disability compensation from January 11, 1963 to 
July 13, 1964, the date on which appellant returned to 
his old job or from January 11, 1963 to January 29, 
1964, the date on which the medical advisory board 
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determined that appellant had a permanent partial dii. 
ability of 20 per cent loss of bodily function. 
Disposition By Industrial Commission 
The Industrial Commission found that appellant 
had been released for work by both Drs. Beck aua 
Powell on January 11, 1963, and that his temporary 
total disability terminated on January 11, 1963. The 
employer had paid temporary total disability compen· 
sation from the date of the injury until January II. 
1963, for the full period during which appellant wa) 
entitled to temporary total disability compensation. 
Appellant was also entitled to a partial permanent dis· 
ability for loss of bodily function of 20 per cent or 40 
weeks at $44.50 per week in addition to the temporary 
total disability previously paid. 
Relief Sought On Appeal 
Appellant seeks to obtain payment for temporary 
total disability from the date his doctors released him 
for work and from additional treatment until he was 
actually reemployed, or, in the alternative, until the 
l\Iedical Advisory Board gave him a rating of 20 per 
cent permanent loss of bodily function. 
Statement Of Facts 
Appellant was injured on or about February IO, 
· 1 t H s treated 1960 in the course of his emp oymen . e wa 
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by Dr. Beck and Dr. Powell and had a spinal fusion 
in June 1962. 
On January II, 1963, Dr. Powell examined appel-
lant and reported that: 
"The patient appears to have had maximum 
benefit from treatment and to have reached a 
fairly stable state but with somewhat greater 
permanent partial impairment than the average 
disc patient. He will apparently be limited in 
his range of activity to relatively sedentary types 
of work. I would consider his permanent partial 
impairment, as the result of disc disease and 
spinal degenerative changes, to be approximately 
fifteen per cent bodily function. 
"No further diagnostic or major therapeutic 
measures seem to be indicated." 
Dr. Beck also examined appellant on January 11, 
1963, and reported: 
"I feel that Mr. Wilstead should be able to 
return to work at the present time ... 
"I do not feel that further active medical treat-
ment is indicated at this time and estimate his 
disability at IO per cent loss of bodily function." 
Appellant did not feel that he was able to do a 
full day's work at the same job he had at the time of 
injury until he was actually reemployed at his old 
job on July 13, 1964 (Record 62-63), but did believe 
that he could have done "a light duty job" (Record 
64). 
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At the hearing of the l\'.ledical Advisory Bo d ar on 
January 25, 1964, appellant was given a rating of a 
20 per cent permanent partial disability. 
Argument 
I. 
This Court's review is limited by Utah Code Anno· 
tated 1953, Section 35-1-84, to a determination of: 
( l ) Whether or not the Commission acted with· 
out or in excess of its powers. 
( 2) If findings of fact are made, whether or no! 
such findings of fact support the award under review. 
Appellant has not claimed that the Industrial Com· 
mission acted without or in excess of its powers ana 
the appeal is not based on a claimed violation by the 
Commission of action beyond its powers. It appear~ 
that appellant bases his appeal on a claim that the Com· 
mission's findings of fact do not support the awaro 
made by the Commission. Appellant has not specifieu 
particular findings of fact which fail to support the 
award made. 
The Commission found, as a fact, that appellan! 
had been released for work by Dr. Beck and Dr. Powell 
on January II, 1963. As a result of this finding ol 
fact the Commission determined that appellant wa~ 
entitled to receive compensation for total disability ur 
to January II, 1963. 
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The Commission also found that the Medical Ad-
visory Board had examined appellant on January 25, 
1964, and had recommended a permanent partial dis-
ability rating of 20 per cent loss of bodily function. 
Based upon this finding of the Medical Advisory Board 
the Commission determined that appellant had a per-
manent partial disability of 20 per cent loss of bodily 
function which entitled him to compensation for 40 
weeks at $44.50 per week. This award of permanent 
partial disability was subsequently paid by defendant 
Independent Coal & Coke Company. 
The record of this case fully supports the findings 
of fact by the Commission and the facts as found fully 
support the award made by the Commission. It is this 
Court's function to determine if the facts found by the 
Commission support the award made and its function 
is not to review the evidence to determine whether there 
is any evidence which could lead to a different award. 
See, e.g., Tintic Standard Min. Co. v. Industrial 
Comm., 100 Utah 96, no P.2d 367; Kelly V. Industrial 
Comm., 80 Utah 73, 12 P.2d lll2; Chief Consol. Min. 
Co. v. Industrial Comm., 70 Utah 333, 260 Pac. 271; 
Park City v. Industrial Comm., 63 Utah 205, 224 Pac. 
655. 
The language of this Court in the Kelly case is here 
appropriate: 
"In cases like this where compensation has 
been denied, and the applicant dissatisfied with 
the decision upon the facts has brou~ht the case 
here by writ of review, we are committed to the 
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rule that the review is limited to the question 
1 whether the commission in denying compen t.o h b" .1 sa ion as ar ~trar1 y. or capriciously disregarded un. 
contradicted evidence. Kavalinakis v Ind c 
• • 0111 
67 Utah, 174, 246 P. 698; Banks v. Ind. Corn. 
74 Utah, 166, 278 P.58; Rukavina v. Ind. Corn. 
68 Utah, 1, 248 P. ll03. This is the correcl 
standar~, 3:ccording to the weight of authority 
for rev1ewmg such findings of fact made bv 
courts a~d j.~ri~s in j~dicial proceedings. Se0e 
Annotation D1sregardmg uncontradicted tes· 
timony in civil actions," 8 A.L.R. 796. 
"\Ve therefore, upon this review, examine the 
evidence, not to ascertain what weight or credi· 
bility we should give it, not to determine whether 
in our opinion a different result should have bm 
reached, but whether or not the commission has 
arbitrarily or capriciously disregarded and re· 
fused to follow and give effect to uncontradicteu 
testimony." 
Appellant has argued in his brief (pp. 3-5) thal 
because Dr. Powell subsequent to January 11, 1960. 
on July 20 ,1963 examined him and determined at that 
time that appellant might never be able to resume heavy 
work and that his physical condition could improve 
even more than it had in the past that this indicates 
that the facts found by the Commission do not supporl 
the award made. When Dr. Powell earlier determinen 
that appellant had received maximum benefit from 
treatment and that further diagnostic or major thera· 
peutic measures were not indicated, he was not sayin~ 
that appellant would never get any better than he wa) 
at that time. He was merely saying that appellant baa 
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reached a point where it was more important for him, 
from a medical point of view, to work than to receive 
additional medical care. At that point appellant was 
not "totally disabled." 
The inferences to be drawn from the written re-
ports of Dr. Powell are not conflicting and furnish no 
basis for a determination by this Court that the Com-
mission's findings are not supported by the facts as 
found by the Commission. 
There is no basis upon which the award of the In-
dustrial Commission can be modified because the find-
ings of fact made by the Commission fully support the 
award made and this is as far as the statute permits 
this Court to inquire. 
II. 
AN INJURED EMPLOYEE CEA~ES TO 
BE TEMPORARILY AND TOTALLY DIS-
ABLED 'VHEN HIS PHYSICAL CONDI-
TION IS SUCH THAT HE IS ONLY PAR-
TIALLY DISABLED AND AN INJURED 
EMPLOYEE WHO IS ONLY PARTIALLY 
DISABED CANNOT BE ENTITLED TO TO-
TAL DISABILITY PAYMENTS. 
The statutes which establish the amounts to be 
paid injured employees are Sections 35-1-65 and 35-
1-66, Utah Code Annotated 1953. These statutes pro-
vide payments to an employee when he is totally but 
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temporarily. disabled and when he is partially but per. 
manently disabled. It is axiomatic that when one is 
only partially disabled he is not totally disabled and 
vice versa. 
This Court has previously held that determinatiou 
of a permanent partial disability ends the period of 
the temporary total disability. See, e.g., Peerless Sales 
Co. et al v. Industrial Comm. et al, 107 Utah 419, 
154 P.2d 644 (1944), where this Court said: 
"It becomes apparent, therefore, that follow· 
ing the accident which occurred to Morrison, 
the doctors determined that he was suffering from 
synovitiis or inflammation of the synovial mem· 
brane of the left knee, for which he was given 
medical treatment and hospitalization from time 
to time until August 11, 1943, on which date it 
was determined that the injury to the knee had 
developed into ankylosis or a complete stiffen· 
ing and loss of use of the left knee, and his dis· 
ability was determined as of that date to be per· 
manent partial, thus ending the period of tern· 
porary total disability. He had been paid com· 
pensation at the rate of $16 a week from Febru· 
ary 20, 1938, to August 11, 1943, during t~i~ 
period of temporary total disability, or the per10d 
in which efforts were being made to restore the 
function of his left knee, and during which tme 
he was totally disabled f ram perf arming anu 
work. This compensation was clearly paid under 
the provisions of Sec. 42-1-61, supra. N?w, when 
his disability became fixed and certain, unde1 
the circumstances stated, the payment of com· 
pensation fell under the provisions of Sec. 42· 
1-62, supra, for the specified loss of the use 01 
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a rnember of his body. Twenty-five weeks' com-
pensation under this permanent partial disability 
had been paid at the time the State Insurance 
Fund ceased making payments, to-wit, February 
1, 1944 ; hence the order of the Commission is 
proper directing plaintiffs to pay to Morrison 
125 weeks' compensation for such permanent 
partial disability "in addition to the compensa-
tion" already paid him for temporary total dis-
ability. Spring Canyon Coal Co. v. Ind. Comm., 
57 Utah 208, 193 P. 821, and particularly the 
later case of the same title in 60 Utah 553, 210 
P. 611; Continental Gas. Co. v. Ind. Comm. 
70 Utah 354, at page 364, 260 P. 279; and se~ 
cases collected in 88 A.L.R., commencing at 
page 385." (Emphasis agded). 
Also see Continental Casualty Co. v. Industrial Comm., 
79 U tab 532, 11 P .2d 329 ( 1932), where this Court 
said: 
"If the hearing of October 7th can be con-
sidered as having proceeded under a new appli-
cation, then, if the first permanent partial status 
(which is the only status with which the plain-
tiffs under the evidence are concerned and in re-
gard to which, under the state of the evidence, 
they could be bound) became fixed as early as 
January 13, 1929, the date which, at all events, 
the ternporary total disability ceased, it would 
appear that the statute of lirnitations h~ run 
as to such clairn. The fact that a change m the 
condition of the applicant occurred due to sub-
sequent accidents while under other emp~oy.ers 
cannot alter the situation as far as these plamtiffs 
are concerned, because there was no causative 
connection between the first injury and the two 
subsequent injuries, and consequently any 
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change of condition after January 13, 1929 · ~ot referable to the first injury. Conseque~tJ18 
it stands .th~t the commission having, as far !s 
these plamhffs are concerned, made a finding 
only as to the permanent partial status as of 
J ~~uary 13, 1929, a!ld that no change of con· 
d1hon was shown or m fact could, with such evi· 
dence as was introduced concerning the final 
status, have been shown so as to be binding on 
these plaintiffs as resulting from the first acci· 
dent, the statute must have run if the hearing 
of October 7, 1931, is to be considered as a new 
application for compensation for the permanent 
partial disability fixed as of January 13, 1929." 
(Emphasis added.) 
The fact is that appellant had recovered sufficiently 
from his injury by January II, 1963, to receive a per· 
manent partial disability rating of IO per cent by Dr. 
Beck and of 15 per cent by Dr. Powell. The fact that 
appellant did not obtain a rating from the Medical 
Panel until January 29, 1964, does not affect the con· 
dition of his physical recovery when examined by the 
treating physicians. The date of the examination h1 
the Medical Advisory Board may, in an appropriate 
case, be important if there is no evidence as to whether 
an injured employee ceased to be totally disablea 
prior to the date of the examination by the Medical 
Advisory Board. In this case there is substantial ano 
persuasive evidence that appellant was not totally dis· 
abled after January II, 1963, as the Commission de· 
termined. 
Appellant cites a letter from Mr. Wiesely, Chair· 
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man, Industrial Commission, to T. Van Campen (Br. 
p. 6). It is not known what the facts and circumstances 
giving rise to this letter were. The letter is not a part 
of the record of this case and is not appropriate for 
consideration by the Court. 
This Court has determined in the case of Spring 
Canyon Coal Co. v. Industrial Comm., 58 Utah 608, 
277 Pac. 206 ( 1929), that an employee is not totally 
disabled when he cannot return to his former employ-
ment but could perform the work of some other employ-
ment. The Court said: 
"It remains to be determined whether or not 
the evidence in the case at bar brings the appli-
cant within the general provision of section 3139. 
It is not always an easy task to determine what 
constitutes total disability. It will rarely be 
found that two cases present the same facts. 
Keeping in mind the purposes of our Workmen's 
Compensation Laws, it may be said generally 
that, where the injured employe's earning power 
is wholly and permanently destroyed, and be-
cause of his injuries he is incapable of perform-
ing remunerative employment, such employe is 
permanently totally disabled. Stated conversely, 
if an injured employe is not prevented from 
securin.g and retaining employment becau~e of 
his injuries, and if he can perform the duties of 
such employment without.pain .or sufferin? and 
without undulv endan,qerzng his health, Zif e, or 
limb then and in such case, the employe is not 
totalb1 di;abled. To make out a case of total 
disability, the applicant is not required .to show 
that he is incapacitated from performmg any 
and all kinds of work. On the other hand, he 
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is required to put forth an active effort to pro-
cure s1;1c~ emplo_yment as he is able to perform. 
If he is incapacitated from performing the kind 
?f labor required in his for mer employment, but 
is able to perform the work of some other em-
ployment, he is not totally disabled. The follow-
ing authorities support or tend to support such 
a general rule: 28 R.C.L, § 106, p. 820; I •. R.A. 
1916A, 145; American Zinc Co. of Tennessee 
v. I:us_k, .1~8 Tenn. 220, 255 S.W:. 39; Employ-
ers Liability Assurance Corporation v. Williams 
et al. (Tex. Civ. App.) 293 S.\V. 210; United 
States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Weir et al. 
(Tex. Civ. App.) 286 S.W. 565; Home Life 
& Accident Co. v. Corsey (Tex. Civ. App.) 216 
S.W. 464; Bishop v. Millers' Indemnity Under· 
writers (Tex. Civ. App.) 254 S.W. 4ll; In re 
Burns, 218 Mass. 8, 105 N.E. 601, Ann Cas. 
1916A, 787; Roller v. Warren et al., 98 Vt. 
514, 129 A. 168; Employers' Mutual Ins. Co. 
et al. v. Industrial Commission of Colorad-0, 
65 Colo. 283, 176 P. 314; Dosen v. East Butte 
Copper Mining Co., 78 Mont. 579, 254 P. 880; 
Moore v. Peet Bros. Manufacturing Co., 99 
Kan. 443, 162 P. 295; Sakamoto v. Kemmerer 
Coal Co., 36 \Vyo. 325, 255 P. 356; Comolida· 
tion Coal Co. v. Crislip et al., 217 Ky. 371, 289 
s.w. 270." 
"The evidence in this case shows that the ap· 
plicant has suffered a seri~us injury, bu~ we are 
of the opinion that there is no substantial com· 
petent evidence which brings him within the class 
of 'permanent total disability.' The case .~as 
disposed of upon the tl?eory t~at the cond1t10n 
of applicant's legs entitled him to an awar~ 
for permanent total disability, regardless 0d 
whether he was or was not able to secure an 
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retain employment. It is a matter of common 
knowledge that persons with injuries similar to 
those sustained by the applicant are able to and 
do perform the duties of some kinds of employ-
ment. It cannot be said as a matter of law under 
our Workmen's Compensation Law that one 
who has his legs partially paralyzed, as does the 
applicant, is unable to secure any kind of em-
ployment and perf arm the duties thereof . ... " 
(Emphasis added). 
There is no judicial nor statutory authority for 
appellant's claim that an injured employee who could 
du light work must be given light work by his former 
employer or that the former employer must pay him 
total disability compensation. The cases cited by appel-
lant from other jurisdictions are inapposite here. The 
statutes here in question are not unemployment com-
pensation statutes but are disability compensation 
statutes. '¥hen the employee is totally disabled he is 
entitled to the compensation provided for total dis-
ability. When he is only partially disabled he is entitled 
to the compensation provided for partial disability and 
the fact that he is unable to perform his former work 
while partially disabled does not, under the statutes, 
entitle him to total disability payments while he is un-
employed. The statute contains no requirement that 
the former employer furnish a light duty job different 
than the one the employee held prior to injury or be 
required to pay total disability compensation for failure 
to provide such light duty employment. 
The only statutory basis for payment of total dis-
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ability payments to appellant beyond January 11, 
1963 is if he is totally disabled and not otherwise. The 
Commission determined that he was not totally disabled 
after January 11, 1963 and this finding supports the 
award made. 
Conclusion 
Appellant's appeal should be dismissed with preju· 
dice. 
Respectfully submitted, 
Dale E. Anderson 
FABIAN & CLENDENIN 
800 Continental Bank Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Attorneys for defendants The 
Independent Coal & Coke Company 
and Continental Casualty Company 
14 
